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Are Emerging Technologies in Airport Passenger Screening 
Reasonable Under the Fourth Amendment? 
I. Introduction 
 September 11, 2001, ushered in a new era in a multitude of 
ways.  At the forefront is the issue of airport security and 
passenger screening.  The United States is faced with the task 
of protecting our citizens, our buildings, our skies, and our 
country from another attack similar to that harrowing day that 
changed the world forever.  Technologies have emerged to help 
thwart a future strike.  Airports across the nation have started 
to implement some of these technologies.  Americans now may be 
subject to “backscatter x-rays” and “explosive trace portals” 
prior to boarding aircraft at our nation’s airports.  These 
tools present a tenuous balancing act between the need for 
national security and citizens’ constitutional right against 
warrantless search and seizure as afforded by the Fourth 
Amendment.   
 The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches 
and seizures.  What amounts to “unreasonable” is the ultimate 
question.  This note will examine modern society’s definition of 
“unreasonable” as it relates to the limits placed on technology 
by the Fourth Amendment.  This note will also scrutinize two 
specific airport passenger screening technologies and where they 
fall on the reasonableness scale.  While the answer may or may 
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not be that our Fourth Amendment protections are implicated by 
these technologies, this note will also look at whether the 
definition of “unreasonable” has been affected by a climate of 
fear; thus, what may have seemed unreasonable before September 
11 may now be deemed reasonable.  This note will also examine 
the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine and the “special 
needs” doctrine as they apply to airport searches and similar 
search methods that filter into general society once they become 
ubiquitous in airports.  Part II will explore the evolution of 
airport passenger screening.  Part III will trace the evolution 
of the Fourth Amendment, case law, and the special needs 
doctrine as it relates to passenger screening.  Part IV will 
apply current law to the current and emerging screening 
technologies and will analyze their constitutionality, 
ultimately opining that while backscatter x-rays and explosive 
trace portals are useful secondary screening tools, if used for 
primary passenger screening they are unreasonable searches. 
Finally, Part V will present a possible resolution to the 
dilemma created by our need for security and our desire for 
privacy, yet will conclude that certain technology may remain 
too invasive to be labeled reasonable.  
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II. The Evolution of Passenger Screening Technology 
 
 A. Background and Purpose 
 Airline passenger screening originated as a preventative 
tool against airline hijackings during the late 1960s and early 
1970s.1  On September 11, 1970, a date that is eerily 
coincidental, President Nixon set forth a plan to combat 
airplane hijacking.2  The program required the airlines to 
develop inspection methods and install surveillance equipment at 
all appropriate U.S. airports.3  As a result, the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) established the Anti-Hijacking 
program.4  United States airlines worked with the Departments of 
Defense and Transportation to ascertain whether military x-ray 
machines and metal detectors could help prevent hijackings.5 
 The FAA issued a rule on February 1, 1972, dictating that 
air carriers must screen all passengers using behavior 
                                                
1 Comm. on Commercial Aviation Sec., Nat’l Research Council, 
Airline Passenger Screening: New Technologies and Implementation 
Issues 1, 6 (Nat’l Acad. Press 1996). 
2 Id. at 6. 
3 Id. 
4 Id.  
5 Id. 
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profiling, magnetometers, identification check, or physical 
search, or some combination of these systems.6  Unfortunately, 
hijackings did not abate; on December 5, 1972, the FAA announced 
emergency rules mandating screening of all passengers and carry-
on baggage for passenger flights.7  This program required 
security systems implemented by the airlines which would prevent 
passengers from bringing weapons, explosives, and incendiary 
devices onto an airplane.8  The primary focus of these screenings 
was, and continues today to be, metallic objects.9  However, as 
turmoil throughout the world increased and U.S. airlines became 
even more attractive to international terrorists, the FAA 
recognized the need to expand airport screening systems.10  The 
capacity to detect different types of metals, as well as plastic 
explosives and other threatening materials, has become a 
necessity.11 
 
 
                                                
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
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 B. Magnetometers (Metal Detectors) 
 A magnetometer is an electronic metal detector resembling a 
door frame.12  A person who walks through the portal passes 
through a magnetic field, activating a warning light or signal.13  
Metal detection portals produce a magnetic field that generates 
eddy currents in metallic or ferromagnetic objects that pass 
through the portal.14  If a passenger carries metal through the 
portal in an amount equal to or greater than the calibration of 
the detector, eddy currents are created.15  When the eddy 
currents are detected, an alarm sounds and screening personnel 
step in to determine if in fact a dangerous object or weapon is 
present.16 
 The science behind the operation of the magnetometer is 
built upon the fact that a magnetic field made up of lines of 
                                                
12 United States v. Lopez, 328 F.Supp. 1077, 1085 (E.D.N.Y. 
1971). 
13 Gibson v. State, 921 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996). 
14 Comm. on Commercial Aviation Sec., Nat’l Research Council, 
supra note 1, at 13. 
15 Id.  
16 Id. 
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flux encircles the earth.17  Since steel and other ferromagnetic 
metals conduct better than air, metal will bend the flux lines 
as the lines seek the path of least resistance by passing 
through the metal rather than the air.18  When distortions happen 
near a “fluxgate magnetometer,” a signal is created which can 
detect the magnetic disturbances.19 
 
 C. Trace Detection Technologies 
 Trace detection entails inferring the presence of 
explosives or other dangerous substances from air or material 
samples physically collected from bodies or clothing.20   
As of September 2006, 37 U.S. airports utilize trace 
detection machines known as “puffers.”21  A puffer is a tall, 
                                                
17 United States v. Lopez, 328 F.Supp. 1077, 1085 (E.D.N.Y. 
1971). 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Comm. on Commercial Aviation Sec., Nat’l Research Council, 
supra note 1 at 4, 16 - 19. 
21 Scott Lindlaw, Airport Screening Technology Developed, 
Forbes.com, Sept. 8, 2006, 
http://www.forbes.com/feeds/ap/2006/09/08/ap3003993.html. 
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transparent tube that a person steps into.22  Rapid blasts of air 
(“not quite enough to ruffle the hair”23) dislodge trace 
particles from the person’s skin and clothes which are sucked 
into a filter and instantly analyzed to determine if that person 
has been in the presence of explosives or narcotics.24  The 
entire process takes approximately 15 seconds.25  Currently, this 
technology is only being used by the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) as a secondary inspection for passengers 
selected for further screening.26 
                                                
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 New Methods to Prevent Terrorism on Aeroplanes Are Being 
Developed, Economist, Aug. 17, 2006, available at 
http://www.economist.com/science/displayStory.cfm?story_id=78015
78; Scott Lindlaw, supra note 20.  
25 Eric Lipton, Screening Tools Slow to Arrive in U.S., N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 3, 2006, at 11.  Puffers were developed by Sandia 
National Laboratories in 1997 and are manufactured by General 
Electric and Smiths Detection. Id.  They are the only machines 
which automatically examine a person from head to toe for 
residue of explosives. Id. 
26 Alex Halperin, Airport Security Goes High-Tech, Bus. Week Eur. 
On Yahoo! Fin., Aug. 13, 2006, 
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There is some concern that puffers could produce false-
positives that would slow down airport screening lines if the 
machines were used as a primary screening tool.27  For example, 
because fertilizer can be used as a bomb ingredient, someone who 
spread fertilizer on their lawn and went to the airport without 
changing their shoes would be identified by the puffer as having 
residue of explosive materials on their body.28  Another drawback 
to using puffers for primary screening is that they cannot 
detect liquid explosives, which are attractive to terrorists, as 
recent events demonstrated.29 
 
 D. Imaging Technologies 
 The United States Department of Homeland Security 
(“Homeland Security”) found that airport screeners using 
magnetometers (metal detection portals, discussed above) 
performed terribly when attempting to identify weapons in carry-
                                                
http://uk.biz.yahoo.com/13082006/244/airport-security-high-
tech.html. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Lipton, supra note 24. 
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on baggage or hidden on people’s bodies.30  These poor field test 
results are Homeland Security’s justification for using 
“backscatter” x-rays.31   
“Imaging technologies can see through clothes and produce 
an image of the human body underneath.”32  Active imaging 
analyzes radiation which is scattered when the body is 
irradiated with x-rays.33  The process is simple.  A person 
stands in front of a large box and a very low power x-ray beam 
sweeps across the body.34  Using three-dimensional imaging, a 
computer converts the data into a picture of the person on a 
monitor.35  Objects that scatter or give off radiation in a 
different manner than the human body will look distinctive in 
                                                
30 Joe Sharkey, On the Road; Airport Screeners Could Get X-Rated 
X-Ray Views, N.Y. Times, May 24, 2005, at C5. 
31 Id. 
32 Comm. on Commercial Aviation Sec., Nat’l Research Council, 
supra note 1, at 3, 14 – 16. 
33 Id. at 3. 
34 Fred Reed, Scanner Virtually Disrobes Passenger, Wash. Times, 
May 22, 2003, http://www.washtimes.com/business/20030521-094809-
8963r.htm. 
35 Id. 
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the image.36  “Reflective” or backscatter x-rays can see objects 
that a metal detector may miss, such as those made from ceramics 
and plastics.37 
These x-rays have been proven to be safe, penetrating a 
mere 1/10th of an inch into the skin.38  In less than eight 
                                                
36 Comm. on Commercial Aviation Sec., Nat’l Research Council, 
supra note 1, at 3. 
37 New Methods to Prevent Terrorism on Aeroplanes Are Being 
Developed, supra note 24.  
38 Reed, supra note 34.  The amount of radiation from a 
backscatter x-ray amounts to less than three mircrorem, which 
“is so low that a passenger would have to go through the 
screening portal approximately 1,000 times to receive the same 
radiation dose as would be received from cosmic ray exposure at 
high altitude during one transcontinental flight from New York 
to Los Angeles.” Comm. on Commercial Aviation Sec., Nat’l 
Research Council, supra note 1, at 31.  “A person would have to 
be scanned with backscatter approximately 80,000 times merely to 
receive the amount of radiation contained in one dental X-ray.” 
Michael C. Murphy & Michael R. Wilds, X-Rated X-Ray Invades 
Privacy Rights, 12 Crim. Just. Pol’y Rev. 333, 338 (2001). 
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seconds, the scan is complete, and no pat-down has to be 
performed.39   
However, as helpful as this technology may be in detecting 
illicit materials, they also produce a problem many see as 
equally disturbing.40  “The pictures are of near-pornographic 
quality....  It amounts to a black-and-white strip search.”41  
Appearing in the image are not only concealed weapons, 
explosives, wallets, and coins, but also rolls of fat, the size 
of breasts and genitals, and catheter tubes.42  Filters have been 
created to blur the genital area in response to arguments that 
the images are too intrusive.43  Cloaking software has also been 
developed which converts the images into “something resembling a 
generic chalk outline of the body, identifying plastic, ceramic, 
biological and other nonmetallic and metallic objects on the 
                                                
39 Reed, supra note 34.   
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id.; Am. Civil Liberties Union, Airport Security: Increased 
Safety Need Not Come at the Expense of Civil Liberties (2002), 
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/resources/16748res20020612.html. 
43 New Methods to Prevent Terrorism on Aeroplanes Are Being 
Developed, supra note 24. 
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body.”44  Manufacturers of the backscatter machines recognize 
that cloaking may reduce detection power, but that may be a 
trade-off that is required in order to balance security and 
privacy issues.45 
 
III. Evolution of the Law 
 
A. The Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause....”46 
                                                
44 Austin Considine, Will New Airport X-Rays Invade Privacy?, 
N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 2005, 
http://travel2.nytimes.com/2005/10/09/travel/09xray.html?ei=5070
&en=d9b0f1a73708dd7d&ex=1162267200&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1162094831-
PRDYC/rksrr5rr333hMnyw. 
45 Id.  The two companies that manufacture the backscatter 
technology are Rapiscan Systems, a division of OSI Systems, and 
American Science and Engineering. Id. 
46 U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
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The question, of course, is what do those words actually 
mean in an airport?  The following section will examine how the 
Fourth Amendment has been construed by the courts with regard to 
airport passenger screening.  Next, a few detailed 
interpretations of the Fourth Amendment’s requirements such as 
expectation of privacy and reasonableness will be discussed.  
Finally, the special needs doctrine will be introduced.  This 
principle will be further analyzed in Part IV where the Fourth 
Amendment will be applied to the two emerging passenger 
screening technologies discussed in Part II. 
 
B. Case Law 
The courts first must determine whether something 
constitutes a search; if there is no search, Fourth Amendment 
protections do not apply.47 
 
 i. Expectation of Privacy 
 Katz v. United States is a landmark Fourth Amendment case.48  
While the case had no connection to airports, it is the starting 
point for this article’s analysis because of its discussion of 
                                                
47 Id. 
48 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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privacy, search and seizure, and governmental action.49  The 
United States Supreme Court’s 1967 opinion is helpful in 
applying the Fourth Amendment to airport settings as it presents 
a threshold test for determining whether the Fourth Amendment 
applies to a particular intrusion.50   
Justice Stewart wrote for the majority and stated that the 
Fourth Amendment does not extend to things a person knowingly 
and publicly reveals.51  On the other hand, the Fourth Amendment 
may protect something a person tries to keep private, even in a 
public area.52  Justice Harlan’s concurrence expands upon what 
                                                
49 Id. The defendant was convicted of violating a statute 
prohibiting bets via wire.  The Court had to determine whether 
the government listening to and recording the defendant when he 
spoke in a public telephone booth violated the defendant’s 
privacy.  Holding that the defendant’s privacy, upon which he 
justifiably relied, was violated, the Court further held that 
this governmental action constituted a search and seizure. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 351. 
52 Id.  The Court stated that making a phone call from a glass 
telephone booth where he could be seen did not cause the 
defendant to believe his words would be also be heard.  “To read 
the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that 
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protection the Fourth Amendment provides to people, stating, 
“there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have 
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, 
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to 
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”53  Harlan’s test has since been 
adopted by the Supreme Court as the method of determining what 
constitutes a search, triggering protection by the Fourth 
Amendment. 
 
  ii. Administrative Searches and Consent 
 “Search[es] of public or commercial premises carried out by 
a regulatory authority for the purpose of enforcing compliance 
with health, safety, or security regulations” are deemed 
administrative searches.54  Private searches are those “conducted 
by a private person rather than a law-enforcement officer.”55   
The issue of consent and how it relates to the passenger’s or 
general public’s knowledge of what type of screening procedures 
are utilized at airports is a concept important to the analysis 
                                                
the public telephone has come to play in private communication.” 
Id. at 352. 
53 Id. at 361. 
54 Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). 
55 Id. 
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of whether emerging technologies are or are not reasonable 
searches and whether they will be barred or allowed by the 
Fourth Amendment.  The language of the Fourth Amendment requires 
“probable cause” prior to a search.56  Probable cause relates to 
the likelihood, not certainty, of existence criminal activity.57  
Administrative searches are an exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s requirement for a warrant based on probable cause, 
but they remain subject to the requirement for reasonableness.58 
 The 1973 Ninth Circuit decision in United States v. Davis 
concerned a defendant who was convicted of trying to board an 
airplane with a loaded gun in his briefcase.59  The Court held 
that even if the search of the defendant’s briefcase was 
conducted by a private employee of the airline, the search was 
state action60 for purposes of the Fourth Amendment because the 
                                                
56 U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
57 Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969). 
58 United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973). 
59 Davis, 482 F.2d at 895. 
60 State action is “anything done by a government; esp., in 
constitutional law, an intrusion on a person’s rights (esp. 
civil rights) either by a governmental entity or by a private 
requirement that can be enforced only by governmental action.” 
Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). 
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search was part of the national anti-hijacking effort instituted 
in 1972.61  The Court stated that evaluation of airport searches 
should be conducted using standards related to “administrative” 
searches.62  Administrative searches are not carried out to 
gather evidence as part of a criminal investigation.63  Rather, 
administrative searches are performed “as part of a general 
regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose.”64 
The court explained that airline passenger screening is part of 
a general regulatory scheme, in furtherance of the 
administrative purpose of preventing weapons or explosives from 
being carried on to airplanes, which will prevent hijackings.65 
                                                
61 Davis, 482 F.2d at 904. 
62 Id. at 908. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id.  The Court went on to explain that the essential purpose 
of the regulatory scheme is to discourage people from weapons or 
explosives on to airplanes, not to actually discover those 
materials and arrest people carrying them. Id.  Further, if 
passenger screening devolves into general searches for evidence 
of crimes, courts will have to exclude any evidence obtained 
from those searches. Id. at 909. 
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 To be valid, administrative searches must meet the standard 
of reasonableness as required by the Fourth Amendment.66  To be 
reasonable, a passenger “screening search must be as limited in 
its intrusiveness as is consistent with satisfaction of the 
administrative need that justifies it.”67  Consequently, valid 
                                                
66 Id. at 910. 
67 Id.  “The scope of the search must be ‘strictly tied to and 
justified by’ the circumstances which rendered its initiation 
permissible.” Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).  
Terry frisks, as they have come to be known, allow police to pat 
down a person who has been legitimately stopped if the police 
have reason to believe the person is armed and dangerous. Terry 
v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  The justification for this frisk is 
that the police are allowed to protect themselves while 
questioning a person about possible criminal activity. Id.  
Terry frisks are therefore not extended to encompass airport 
screening searches because that “would result in intrusions upon 
privacy unwarranted by the need.” Davis, 482 F.2d at 907.  
“There is no reason to believe that the incidence of concealed 
weapons is greater among airline passengers than among members 
of the public generally, and Terry does not justify the 
wholesale ‘frisking’ of the general public in order to locate 
weapons and prevent future crimes.” Id. at 907-08. 
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passenger screening searches at airports must acknowledge a 
person’s right to decide not to board an airplane and therefore 
not be subject to the search.68  The Court utilized the issue of 
consent as the measurement of whether the search was prohibited 
by the Fourth Amendment.69  A person has the choice, as a matter 
of constitutional law, to submit to a search of his person and 
carry-on baggage as a condition to boarding an airplane, or to 
leave.70  The passenger’s choice can be seen as either a decision 
to give up the right to leave or a decision to submit to the 
search.71  Either way, the choice is seen as “a ‘consent,’ 
granting the government a license to do what it would otherwise 
be barred from doing by the Fourth Amendment.”72  This consent 
must be voluntary.73  The Court suggested that airports make the 
options available to passengers approaching screening areas so 
obvious that someone who decides to board an airplane has 
                                                
68 Id. at 910-11.  
69 Id. at 913.  
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 913-14 (discussing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 
218 (1973). 
 
 20 
consented to the screening.74  However, at the time the incident 
at issue occurred, in 1971, “[t]he nature and scope of airport 
searches were not then widely known.”75  Therefore, without clear 
notice of the choice to be screened or not board the airplane, 
attempting to board the airplane was not necessarily consent.76 
 Passenger consent to airport screening searches and the 
general population’s awareness of the forms of screening 
procedures employed at airports, are critical components of the 
analysis of whether the Fourth Amendment will permit or prevent 
the use of emerging screening technologies.  Both consent and 
awareness are aspects of reasonableness.  The more the public 
knows about newer technologies and the more the public accepts 
their use, the greater the likelihood the technologies will be 
deemed reasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment. 
 
  iii. Danger Satisfies Reasonableness Test  
 As demonstrated throughout this article, determining 
reasonableness is the crux of the Fourth Amendment search issue.  
In 1973, the Fifth Circuit decided that some situations present 
                                                
74 Id. at 914. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
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a level of danger such that the reasonableness test is per se 
satisfied.77 
Lee Skipwith III was convicted of cocaine possession after 
an airport screening search revealed drugs, but not weapons.78  
In United States v. Skipwith the Fifth Circuit affirmed the 
Middle District of Florida, holding that the search was 
constitutional.79  The Court found that balance must be struck 
between the harm and the need to determine what is reasonable.80  
“When the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and 
millions of dollars of property inherent in the pirating or 
blowing up of a large airplane, the danger alone meets the test 
of reasonableness.”81 
                                                
77 United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973). 
78 Id. 
79 Id. The drugs were also held to be properly admitted into 
evidence at trial. Id.  This line of inquiry is outside the 
scope of this article. 
80 Id. at 1276. 
81 Id.  The Court further explained that the search must have a 
reasonable scope, must be conducted in good faith in order to 
prevent hijacking, and the passenger must have received advance 
notice of the search in such a manner that he could avoid the 
search by opting not to fly. Id. 
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 The Skipwith Court expanded on United States v. Moreno82 by 
holding that “those who actually present themselves for boarding 
on an air carrier, like those seeking entrance into the country, 
are subject to a search based on mere or unsupported 
suspicion.”83  The Court analogized the difference between the 
main airport and the boarding gate to the difference between the 
borders of the country and the interior of the country.84 
 The defendant also unsuccessfully argued that the search he 
was subjected to was too broad in scope: that the search was 
constitutionally limited to a frisk for weapons and he should 
not have been required to empty his pockets.85  Noting that 
                                                
82 United States v. Moreno, 480 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1973), held 
that reasonableness should be determined on a case-by-case basis 
when regarding searches of people in the general airport area. 
83 Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1276. 
84 Id. at 1276-77. 
85 Id. at 1277.  The officer asked Skipwith to empty his pockets 
once he noticed a three inch by two inch bulge in his pants 
pocket, after discovering he was traveling under a false name, 
and after noticing that the defendant was very nervous and 
appeared to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Id. at 
1273-74.  The officer later testified that he believed the bulge 
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“[t]he range and variety of devices real and simulated which can 
be used to intimidate the crew of an aircraft while it is aloft 
is almost limitless[,]” the Court found that the officer “was 
justified in undertaking a search with sufficient scope to 
reveal an object or instrumentality that Skipwith could 
reasonably have used to effect an act of air piracy.”86 
 The amount of danger posed to the public by a person who 
seeks to blow up an airplane coupled with the concept of airport 
boarding gates as analogous to our nation’s borders has created 
a situation in the U.S. where passenger airport screening 
searches may be viewed by the courts as virtually per se 
reasonable.  The important issue for emerging screening 
technologies is whether factors unique to those technologies 
make the reasonableness of their use less certain.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
was a gun, although it turned out to be a plastic bag containing 
cocaine. Id. at 1274. 
86 Id. at 1277 (5th Cir. 1973).  The Court went on to say that 
the three inch by two inch pocket bulge clearly fell within the 
limit of such a search. Id. 
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  iv. Magnetometers are Administrative Searches 
 A section of the Gibson v. State87 decision addressed 
whether the defendant was subjected to unlawful restraint by 
being required to pass through a metal detector before entering 
a courthouse.88  This part of the opinion traces the evolution of 
case law related to the Fourth Amendment, administrative 
searches, and airport searches.89   
Gibson was a Texas attorney who petitioned for a writ of 
habeas corpus alleging that his liberty was restrained by the 
Sheriff of El Paso County, who required that Gibson walk through 
a metal detector and pass his belongings through an x-ray 
machine, similar to the requirements in airports, before being 
allowed to enter the courthouse.90  The Court restated the long-
standing finding that “the use of a magnetometer is a ‘search’ 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”91  The Court 
explained that only unreasonable searches and seizures are 
forbidden by the Constitution, and that “warrantless searches 
                                                
87 Gibson v. State, 921 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996). 
88 Id. at 756-759. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 747. 
91 Id. at 757 (citing United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 
770 (4th Cir. 1972)). 
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are per se unreasonable unless the search falls within one of ‘a 
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’”92   
 The courthouse magnetometer search was a warrantless 
search, the reasonableness of which must be determined by 
weighing the governmental interest against the invasion of 
privacy caused by the search.93  As the Court analyzed the 
reasonableness of the situation at hand, it evaluated prior 
decisions that related to magnetometer searches at airports.94  
The Court determined that the proper standard to be used to 
assess magnetometer searches is that of the administrative 
search because at its heart, an administrative search is not 
conducted to gather evidence as part of a criminal 
investigation, but rather is performed as part of a general 
regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose.95 
  
                                                
92 Gibson, 921 S.W.2d at 757 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). 
93 Id. “The search must be ‘justified at its inception’ and 
‘reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which 
justified the interference in the first place.’” Id. (quoting 
Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). 
94 Id. at 757-59. 
95 Id. at 757-58.  See supra text Part III.B.ii.  
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  v. Avoiding Airport Screening Searches by Electing Not 
to Fly 
 The main airport area has been distinguished from the 
boarding gate area.96  Airport screening searches are not 
conducted until a person wishes to move into the boarding gate 
area.  Since September 11, 2001, only ticketed passengers are 
allowed to pass through to the boarding gates.97  The question of 
specifically when a person can change his mind about whether to 
be screened and to fly was addressed in Torbet v. United 
Airlines Inc.98 
At a Los Angeles International Airport security checkpoint, 
Hugo Torbet walked through the metal detector and sent his 
carry-on bag through the x-ray scanner.99  Torbet’s bag was 
selected for a random search, but he refused to allow it.100  
                                                
96 See supra Part III.B.iii.  
97 Each airline may make exceptions for minors traveling alone, 
the elderly, or those with physical challenges. Denver 
International Airport, Frequently Asked Questions About Security 
Procedures, http://www.flydenver.com/guide/tips/security.asp 
(last visited Feb. 19, 2007).  
98 Torbet v. United Airlines Inc., 298 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2002). 
99 Id. at 1088. 
100 Id. 
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Torbet declared that he wished to leave the airport rather than 
consent to the search, but was told by a police officer (who had 
been called for by security personnel) that he could not leave 
until his bag was searched.101  Nothing of significance was found 
in the search, and Torbet continued on to his flight.102   
Torbet later sued on a number of grounds, challenging “the 
policy that bags be subject to random search without reasonable 
suspicion that the bags contain weapons or explosives.”103  The 
District Court found for the defendants.104  Torbet appealed on 
only one of his claims, arguing “that random post-x-ray searches 
are facially invalid, in the absence of express consent, unless 
the x-ray scan arouses suspicion.”105   
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, stating that under Davis,106 
screening procedures at airports must be reasonable to comply 
with the Fourth Amendment.107  “An airport screening search is 
                                                
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 1089. 
105 Id. 
106 United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973). 
107 Torbet, 298 F.3d at 1089 (citing Davis, 482 F.2d at 904, 
910). 
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reasonable if: (1) it is not more extensive or intensive than 
necessary, in light of current technology, to detect weapons or 
explosives; (2) it is confined in good faith to that purpose; 
and (3) passengers may avoid the search by electing not to 
fly.”108  The election not to fly must occur prior to the 
passenger putting luggage on the x-ray conveyor.109  The Court 
then held that by putting his bag on the x-ray conveyor belt 
Torbet impliedly consented to the random search.110 
 
  vi. Warrantless, Suspicionless Searches 
 Christian Hartwell was arrested for possession of crack 
cocaine after setting off a metal detector at a security 
                                                
108 Id. (citing Davis, 482 F.2d at 913). 
109 Id. (citing United States v. Pulido-Baquerizo, 800 F.2d 899, 
901-02 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
110 Id. “‘[P]assengers placing luggage on an x-ray machine’s 
conveyor belt for airplane travel at a secured boarding area 
impliedly consent to a visual inspection and limited hand search 
of their luggage if the x-ray scan is inconclusive in 
determining whether the luggage contains weapons or other 
dangerous objects.’” Id. (quoting Pulido-Baquerizo, 800 F.2d at 
901). 
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checkpoint in the Philadelphia International Airport.111  A hand-
held wand magnetometer was subsequently used to determine what 
had caused the portal detector alarm.112  What transpired next is 
disputed by the parties,113 but based on the undisputed facts, 
                                                
111 United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 175 (3rd Cir. 2006). 
112 Id.  
113 The defendant claimed he was taken to a private screening 
room by a Transportation Security Administration agent.  The 
agent repeatedly requested that Hartwell show what was in his 
pockets.  After multiple refusals, the agent reached into the 
defendant’s pocket, pulled out a package of drugs, and called 
the Philadelphia police.  The police then searched the 
defendant, found two more packages of drugs, and arrested him.   
In contrast, the government claimed that neither the TSA 
agent nor the police reached into the defendant’s pocket without 
consent.  The agent said that Hartwell requested a private 
screening and then refused to show the contents of his pocket.  
He then “nervously backed away” from the agent and “suddenly 
dropped his pants.”  This caused the agent to call for backup.  
When a police officer arrived, the defendant responded to the 
officer’s request to remove items from his pocket by handing 
over a package of drugs.  Hartwell then pretended to fall on the 
floor and dropped another drug package. 
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both the District Court and Third Circuit found the search was 
justified.114 
 The Third Circuit held the administrative search doctrine 
permitted the search and did not evaluate the lower court’s 
                                                
Neither the defendant nor the government disputed that the 
defendant set off the metal detector.  Hartwell did not dispute 
that he was told to remove all metal objects from his body prior 
to screening and that he was asked to remove objects from a 
specific pocket multiple times.  The District Court found the 
officers’ actions were justified on these facts, regardless of 
which account of the rest of story was true. Id. at 176. 
114 Id. The District Court held the search was permissible under 
three theories: 1) the search was not unreasonable, thereby was 
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment; 2) the search “was a 
‘consensual administrative search;’” and 3) the defendant gave 
his implied consent to the search when he submitted to the 
screening process and once the alarm sounded, the defendant was 
required by law to finish the search to determine the alarm’s 
cause. Id. at 175 (3rd Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. 
Hartwell, 296 F.Supp.2d 596, 602 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (citing United 
States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973)). 
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alternate theories.115  While a search in the absence of 
suspicion or wrongdoing is normally unreasonable, the Supreme 
Court has acknowledged a few circumstances in which this rule is 
inapplicable.116  “These circumstances typically involve 
administrative searches of ‘closely regulated’ businesses, other 
so-called ‘special needs’ cases, and suspicionless ‘checkpoint’ 
searches.”117  The Court stated that suspicionless searches at 
checkpoints “are permissible under the Fourth Amendment when a 
                                                
115 United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 177-78 (3rd Cir. 
2006). In an opinion published on the day he received his 
commission to be Justice of the United States Supreme Court, 
Judge Alito noted that airport security screenings prior to 
boarding a plane are searches.  One difficulty in this case 
concerned whether the defendant was subject to multiple searches 
or one extended search.  While there is case law on both sides 
of this argument, the Court here followed Skipwith and similar 
cases, which “analyze an entire checkpoint search, including 
‘[m]etal detectors, visual inspection, and rare but potential 
physical searches,’ as a single search.” Id. (quoting United 
States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1275-76 (5th Cir. 1973)). 
116 Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 178. 
117 Id.  The special needs doctrine is addressed infra Part 
III.C. 
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court finds a favorable balance between ‘the gravity of the 
public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the 
seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the 
interference with individual liberty.’”118   
The Court then found that the airport checkpoint in this 
case passed this balancing test.119  First, the Court emphasized 
the importance of preventing terrorist attacks against 
airplanes.120  Next, the Court found that the public interest is 
advanced by security checkpoints at airports because without 
searches, there is not a reliable way to determine which 
passengers may hijack a plane.121  Finally, the Court stated that 
minimally intrusive search procedures were utilized in this 
case.122 
                                                
118 Id. at 178-79 (citing Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427 
(2004) (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979)).   
119 Id. at 179. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 179-80. 
122 Id. at 180. The Court found that the procedures used “were 
well-tailored to protect personal privacy, escalating in 
invasiveness only after a lower level of screening disclosed a 
reason to conduct a more probing search.” Id. 
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This case is significant for several reasons.  First, it is 
quite recent, having been decided on January 31, 2006.123  
Second, the opinion takes a definitive position on an aspect of 
screenings that the courts have been divided on by stating that 
the administrative search doctrine permitted the search in this 
case.124  Third, the Court addressed administrative searches at 
length and spelled out the test for when warrantless, 
suspicionless searches are permissible.125  This test will be an 
important tool for evaluating new security screening 
technologies.  Finally, the opinion was written by then-Judge 
Alito,126 now Supreme Court Justice Alito, which may give us a 
glimpse into the future and how the Supreme Court may interpret 
the Fourth Amendment as it relates to new technologies in 
airport passenger screening. 
  
 C. The Special Needs Doctrine 
 The ‘special needs’ doctrine is an exception to the general 
rule that warrantless and suspicionless searches are presumed to 
                                                
123 Id. at 174. 
124 Id. at 177. 
125 Id. at 177-181. 
126 Id. at 174. 
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be unreasonable.127  This doctrine allows government officials to 
conduct searches in the absence of any suspicion of criminality 
in limited circumstances where the purpose of the search is not 
to gather evidence for the investigation of crime.128 
This doctrine originated in Justice Blackmun’s 1985 
concurring opinion in New Jersey v. T.L.O.129  Blackmun agreed 
the balancing test the majority applied was correct; however, he 
noted that “[o]nly in those exceptional circumstances in which 
special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make 
the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a 
                                                
127 Fourth Amendment ‘Special Needs’ Doctrine Justifies 
Suspicionless Subway Checkpoints, 75 U.S. L. Week 1115, 1115 
(2006). 
128 Tracy Maclin, Is Obtaining an Arrestee’s DNA a Valid Special 
Needs Search Under the Fourth Amendment? What Should (and Will) 
the Supreme Court Do? 170 (Boston University School of Law, 
Working Paper Series, Public law & Legal Theory, Working Paper 
No. 06-15, 2006), available at 
http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/abstract
s/2006/pdf_files/MaclinT062806.pdf.  Fourth Amendment ‘Special 
Needs’ Doctrine Justifies Suspicionless Subway Checkpoints, 
supra note 127, at 1115. 
129 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
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court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that 
of the Framers.”130  The special needs doctrine was embraced in 
later cases by a majority of the Court as the standard for 
evaluating whether suspicionless searches are valid.131   
Recently, the Second Circuit evaluated checkpoint searches 
at New York City subway stations.132  Because the search program 
was aimed only at detecting explosives and people were free to 
refuse to be searched if they left the subway, the Court held 
that protecting the subway from terrorist attack was a special 
need aside from general law enforcement.133  This is the 
                                                
130 Id. at 351. 
131 Maclin, supra note 128 at 172.  
132 MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260 (2nd Cir. 2006).  
133 Id. at 270-71.  “Accordingly, preventing a terrorist from 
bombing the subways constitutes a special need that is distinct 
from ordinary post hoc criminal investigation.” Id. at 271.  The 
opinion then cited to United States v. Hartwell, noting that 
decision rejected a “Fourth Amendment challenge to airport 
checkpoints and recogniz[ed] the need to ‘prevent terrorist 
attacks on airplanes.’” Id. at 271 (citing United States v. 
Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 179 (3rd Cir. 2006)).  
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threshold showing the special needs doctrine requires.134  The 
plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued that defending the subway 
against terrorists only constitutes a special need if an attack 
is imminent.135  The Second Circuit concluded that an emergency 
did not have to exist in order to qualify a crime prevention 
search as a special need.136 
The doctrine next requires the court analyzing the validity 
of a suspicionless search to balance opposing factors such as 
whether the government interest for the search program is 
immediate and substantial, whether the person being searched has 
                                                
134 Fourth Amendment ‘Special Needs’ Doctrine Justifies 
Suspicionless Subway Checkpoints, supra note 127, at 1115. 
135 The plaintiffs based their argument on a comment made by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond: “Of 
course, there are circumstances that may justify a law 
enforcement checkpoint where the primary purpose would 
otherwise, but for some emergency, relate to ordinary crime 
control.” Fourth Amendment ‘Special Needs’ Doctrine Justifies 
Suspicionless Subway Checkpoints, supra note 127, at 1115 
(quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 
(2000)). 
136 Id.  See also MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 271 (2nd Cir. 
2006). 
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an actual and reasonable expectation of privacy surrounding the 
item being searched, whether the search is minimally intrusive, 
and whether the search program effectively advances the 
government interest.137  Taking these factors in turn, the Court 
first stated that significant weight can be assigned to the 
government’s interest in preventing great harm to the public 
whether or not an express threat exists.138  In fact, “[a]ll that 
is required is that the ‘risk to public safety [be] substantial 
and real’ instead of merely symbolic.”139  Next, the Court 
decided that subway passengers have an expectation of privacy 
with regards to objects they carry in closed, opaque bags.140  
However, the subway checkpoint search minimally intruded upon 
the passengers’ privacy expectation.141  Finally, the Court 
                                                
137 Fourth Amendment ‘Special Needs’ Doctrine Justifies 
Suspicionless Subway Checkpoints, supra note 127, at 1115.  See 
also MacWade, 460 F.3d at 270-71 (explaining the second facet of 
the special needs doctrine is to determine the reasonableness of 
a search by balancing several factors). 
138 MacWade, 460 F.3d at 272. 
139 Id. (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322-23 
(1997)). 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
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stated that it was not their place to perform an in depth 
analysis of the efficacy of the checkpoint search program.142  
Rather, the Court found that the program was an effective 
deterrent, in part because “expert testimony established that 
terrorists seek predictable and vulnerable targets, and the [New 
York Police Department’s subway] Program generates uncertainty 
that frustrates that goal, which, in turn, deters an attack.”143  
The Court therefore held that the subway checkpoint search 
program was reasonable and constitutional, by use of the special 
needs doctrine.144 
 
IV. Application of the Law 
 Tracing the evolution of the law as it applies to airport 
screenings reveals a number of points about our Fourth Amendment 
protections that are disturbing.  A review of the cases related 
to airport searches illustrates that the private person rarely 
wins and the searches are almost always found to be 
reasonable.145  Further, avoiding screening by electing not fly 
does not amount to a real choice by the passenger.   
                                                
142 Id. at 273. 
143 Id. at 274. 
144 Id. at 275. 
145 See supra Part II. 
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Searches must be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, but 
reasonableness for airport searches is judged by weighing the 
individual’s right to be free from intrusion against the general 
public’s interest in traveling safely by air.146  As declared in 
Torbet, the test for determining whether an airport screening 
search is reasonable stems from Davis and consists of three 
elements: “(1) it is not more extensive or intensive than 
necessary, in light of current technology, to detect weapons or 
explosives; (2) it is confined in good faith to that purpose; 
and (3) passengers may avoid the search by electing not to 
fly.”147 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
146 United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 616 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(citing United States v. Pulido-Baquerizo, 800 F.2d 899, 901 
(9th Cir. 1986).  
147 Torbet v. United Airlines Inc., 298 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 
2002) (citing United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 913 (9th 
Cir. 1973)). 
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 A. Magnetometers (Metal Detectors) 
 The law is clear that metal detectors, or magnetometers, 
are reasonable searches at airports.148  A person walking through 
a metal detection portal is subject to a minimal invasion of 
privacy and the portal “does not annoy, frighten, or humiliate 
those who pass through it.”149  In perhaps the clearest statement 
of why metal detector searches are reasonable, the Fourth 
Circuit stated, “the use of a magnetometer to detect metal ... 
is not a resented intrusion on privacy, but, instead, a welcome 
reassurance of safety.  Such a search is more than reasonable; 
it is a compelling necessity to protect essential air commerce 
and the lives of passengers.”150 
 When magnetometers were first introduced as a regular part 
of airport screening in the early 1970’s, most people laughed at 
the thought of security personnel going through their bags and 
                                                
148 Gibson v. State, 921 S.W.2d 747, 757 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) 
(citing United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 770 (4th Cir. 
1972)).  
149 United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 806 (2nd Cir. 
1974)). 
150 United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 772 (4th Cir. 1972). 
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determining what they were carrying on their bodies.151  But as 
history reveals, we adjusted to metal detector screenings prior 
to boarding planes, and now society regards them as normal.152  
In fact, now people may even be hesitant to get on plane if 
there was no security screening prior to boarding.  Acceptance 
of this type of warrantless and suspicionless search has 
trickled into other parts of society as well.153  There are metal 
                                                
151 Wayne LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth 
Amendment § 10.6 (3d ed. 1996). 
152 Paul Glastris, ...One That Should Be The Best, But Isn’t, 
Washington Monthly, Mar. 1998, available at 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1316/is_n2_v20/ai_6424713.  
153 For example, in 1994, the Kentucky Attorney General released 
an opinion regarding metal detector searches in schools.  
Stating that the administrative search doctrine had been used to 
find metal detector searches in airports constitutional, the 
opinion found that the doctrine also supported the use of metal 
detectors in schools due to the increased number of weapons 
being brought into schools.  The Attorney General further noted 
that the administrative search doctrine had also been used to 
uphold the use of metal detectors in courthouses.  Op. Ky. Att’y 
Gen. 94-58 (1994). 
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detectors at courthouses, schools, and stadiums.154  While some 
may find magnetometers at these types of locations annoying, 
society in general has allowed their use without an uproar that 
our Fourth Amendment rights are being violated.155 
                                                
154 “It is, for example, common practice to require every 
prospective airline passenger, or every visitor to a public 
building, to pass through a metal detector that will reveal the 
presence of a firearm or an explosive.” Michigan Dept. of State 
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
“The metal detectors has [sic] their advent at the airports. 
Their use has spread to prisons and courts. At the time of 
submitting this petition, their use has spread to some urban 
schools.”  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 36-37, Lamson v. 
United States, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1013 (1993) (No. 03-3674). 
155 In fact, cases regarding metal detectors are virtually non-
existent at the Supreme Court level.  “This Court has never 
dealt with a case involving the legality of stationary metal 
detector searches at federal building that house courts such as 
those in which defendant practices. Indeed, the Court has never 
taken certiorari in cases involving challenges to metal detector 
searches at airports.”  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 36-
37, Lamson v. United States, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1013 (1993) 
(No. 03-3674). 
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 It is a slippery slope to be mindful of, particularly in 
light of the much more intrusive search technologies that are 
emerging for use in airports.  We risk eroding our Fourth 
Amendment rights to the point of being meaningless if we allow 
our adjustment to technology in airports to become an automatic 
approval for using that technology in other contexts.156  The 
White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security was 
reminded of this consequence in 1996: “[B]e mindful that the 
security system adopted for airports today will likely be 
imposed in other arenas tomorrow.  Just as magnetometers and X-
ray machines have found their ways into government buildings, 
banks, and schools, so may the enhanced security measures the 
Commission may recommend.”157  These other contexts do not share 
                                                
156 “The process of intrusion into one’s daily life is rapidly 
becoming routine as society becomes desensitized to the creeping 
encroachment on individual privacy.  Increasing intrusions on 
privacy at venues other than border checkpoints or airports 
naturally follow....  Hence, the slippery slope of eroding 
privacy begins.” Murphy & Wilds, supra note 38, at 333.  
157 Gregory T. Nojeim, Legislative Counsel, Am. Civil Liberties 
Union, Civil Liberties Implications of Airport Security 
Measures, Statement Before White House Commission in Aviation 
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many of the characteristics of airports that made the searches 
“reasonable” in the first place.  For example, courthouses and 
stadiums are not analogous to national borders.  One cannot 
elect to not attend school if one does not wish to consent to a 
search.158 
 
  i. Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions 
 Proceeding down that slippery slope of magnetometers 
prompts an aside regarding the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions.  This doctrine asserts that the government cannot 
force a person to relinquish a constitutional right in exchange 
for a discretionary benefit that has little relation to that 
right.159  
                                                
Safety and Security (Sept. 5, 1996) 
(http://www.epic.org/privacy/fee/aclu_testimony.html). 
158 Massachusetts passed the first compulsory school attendance 
law in 1852.  Every state in the nation had a similar law by 
1918. Samuel L. Blumenfeld, Are Compulsory School Attendance 
Laws Necessary? Part 1, Freedom Daily, Mar. 1991, 
http://www.fff.org/freedom/0391c.asp.  
159 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994).  See also 
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (explaining that 
despite the fact that one does not have a right to a government 
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 In the airport context, the benefit that the government 
confers is the use of government facilities for air transport 
and the use of the nation’s air lanes.  The government grants 
this benefit on the condition that people relinquish their 
Fourth Amendment right to be free from searches absent probable 
cause.  As stated above, the doctrine requires that the 
relinquishment of the right must be substantially related to the 
benefit conferred.  Since metal detector searches are designed 
to prevent airline hijackings and to promote the safety of air 
travel, the condition is substantially related to the benefit.  
September 11 further demonstrated the substantial relationship 
between the necessity of relinquishing the right to be free from 
searches absent probable cause and the benefit of traveling by 
air.  Therefore, with regards to airport screenings, the 
condition the government imposes is constitutional. 
 However, that same search via use of a metal detector may 
not satisfy the doctrine in the school or courthouse context.  
This is because entering schools and courthouses are not 
discretionary benefits, as is using an airport.  There is a 
fundamental constitutional right to go to school (in fact, the 
                                                
benefit and the government may have many reasons for denying one 
a benefit, denial may not be based on an infringement of 
constitutionally protected interests).  
 
 46 
government has made this mandatory160) and to go to court, but 
not to fly.161  This means the government has no right to block 
people from accessing schools or courts.  The level of scrutiny 
applied to the examination of the substantial relationship 
between the right relinquished and the benefit conferred is 
roughly the same as the standard of review used for direct 
infringements of the constitutional right involved.  Since 
strict scrutiny is utilized for fundamental rights, the analysis 
of whether the conditions imposed on people entering schools and 
courthouses are unconstitutional would be much more stringent 
than the analysis used in the airport context.   
It may be that metal detector searches can be shown to be 
substantially related to entering schools and courthouses, even 
using strict scrutiny.  But what about the emerging airport 
screening technologies that are more intrusive?  It is not yet 
                                                
160 E.g., People v. Dukes, 580 N.Y.S.2d 850, 853 (1992).  See 
also supra note 158 (discussing states’ enactments of compulsory 
school attendance laws). 
161 The fundamental right to travel does not translate to a 
fundamental right to fly.  If one is denied a single mode of 
travel, even the most convenient mode, the right to travel has 
not been infringed upon. Gilmore v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1125, 
1136-37 (2006). 
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settled that those are constitutional in the airport setting, 
much less anywhere else.162  We need to be wary of new 
technologies used for airport searches reaching into other parts 
of society without our first performing a thorough examination 
of what rights would be eroded by their allowance.163  
 
B. Trace Detection Technologies 
The “puffer” machines being utilized at more and more 
airports intrude minimally on the privacy of passengers, similar 
to metal detectors.  Therefore, the analysis of whether they 
satisfy the reasonableness test is virtually identical to that 
for magnetometers.164 
The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) favors machines 
such as puffers because they “preserve the privacy and dignity 
                                                
162 See infra, Parts IV.B and IV.C. 
163 See generally Dukes, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 853 (comparing 
administrative searches using metal detectors in schools to 
those in airports and courthouses).  Dukes was the first case 
which litigated the issue of metal detectors in schools. Charles 
J. Russo & Jacqueline A. Stefkovich, Search and Seizure in the 
Schools, NASSP Bull. (Nat’l Ass’n of Secondary School 
Principals), Sept. 1998.  
164 See supra Part IV.A. 
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of passengers far more than pat-downs, physical searches, and 
backscatter x-rays.”165  False positives are a continuing concern 
with this technology.166  Items such as heart medicines may be so 
similar chemically to an explosive that the alarm is 
triggered.167  The ACLU suggests that Congress oversees the 
implementation of puffers to make certain that there is not an 
unacceptably high percentage of false positives and that people 
who prompt false positives are treated fairly.168   
It should be noted that trace detection machines which can 
identify chemical signatures could be used to recognize illegal 
                                                
165 Timothy D. Sparapani, Legislative Counsel, Am. Civil 
Liberties Union, Testimony Regarding the U.S. Transportation 
Security Administration’s Physical Screening of Airline 
Passengers and Related Cargo and Airport Screening, Principles 
for Evaluating Physical Screening Techniques and Technologies 
Consistent with Constitutional Norms, Before the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (Apr. 4, 
2006) (http://www.aclu.org/privacy/gen/24856leg20060404.html). 
166 See supra Part II.C.  
167 Id. 
168  Id.  
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drugs.169  Use in this capacity would constitute an illegal 
search “because airport searches are authorized only to identify 
objects or materials that are a threat to the safety of the 
airplane.”170  Since illegal drugs do not in and of themselves 
threaten airplane safety, airport security is not allowed to 
search specifically for drugs.171 
While no court has yet been faced with deciding the 
constitutionality of trace detection portals, the analogy to 
metal detectors and the reasonableness of their use at airports 
seems certainly predictable.  Because the intrusion on personal 
privacy is negligible, there is little concern that the use of 
this emerging technology in passenger screening will erode our 
Fourth Amendment rights.  In the absence of an invasion of 
bodily privacy, there seems little basis to declare puffers to 
be unreasonable searches. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
169 Comm. on Commercial Aviation Sec., Nat’l Research Council, 
supra note 1, at 42 . 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
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C. Imaging Technologies 
Backscatter x-rays are certainly considered searches under 
the Katz test.172  People have an expectation of privacy for what 
is under their clothes.173  Whether backscatter x-rays are 
reasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment is far from 
clear.  What is clear is that many groups oppose the use of this 
technology.  Privacy International awarded the Federal Aviation 
Administration the “Most Invasive Proposal” Award for the 
BodyScan scanners being placed in airports for use by Customs.174  
Privacy International presents its “Big Brother Awards” annually 
in the U.S. (as well a number of other countries) to 
organizations that invade personal privacy the most.175   
Although ten years ago imaging technologies such as 
backscatter x-rays were just beginning to be developed, privacy 
                                                
172 See supra Part II.B.i. 
173 Addie S. Ries, America's Anti-hijacking Campaign--Will It 
Conform to Our Constitution?, 3 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 123 (2001). 
174 The award statue is called the “Orwell” and depicts a boot 
stomping on a head.  See 
http://www.privacyinternational.org/bigbrother/us2000/.  
175 Id. 
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concerns were already contemplated.176  As with trace detection 
of illegal drugs, imaging technology presents the ability to 
discover illegal items on a passenger’s body that are not 
threatening, and therefore are not within the scope of the 
constitutional search.177  The Panel on Passenger Screening 
stated, “Fourth Amendment challenges based on illegal search or 
on an improperly carried out search must be expected when these 
technologies are implemented in airports.”178  Another issue the 
Panel predicted in 1996 related to archiving of the images.179  
They noted that the ability to store images of passengers until 
flights arrived safely at their destinations could generate 
invasion of privacy lawsuits.180  The Panel stressed that 
protocols related to the use and disposal of the images of 
passengers’ bodies must be developed to safeguard this highly 
sensitive and personal data.181 
                                                
176 Comm. on Commercial Aviation Sec., Nat’l Research Council, 
supra note 1, at 14-16. 
177 Id. at 41. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
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Those who support the use of backscatter x-rays point out 
that courts have allowed passenger searches via metal detectors 
under the administrative search doctrine and the public has 
grown accustomed to submitting searches in many places in 
addition to airports.182  The issue with backscatter x-rays (and 
other emerging technologies) is therefore how they differ from 
metal detectors.183  One argument is that an increased need for 
security in our airports could create a justification for the 
courts to allow suspicionless searches no matter what level of 
privacy intrusion is created.184  A second argument is that the 
backscatter x-ray would be used as an alternative to hand or 
strip-searches, both of which are more intrusive than the 
backscatter.185  Finally, backscatter x-rays detect plastic 
explosives and weapons components that metal detectors miss.186 
                                                
182 Murphy & Wilds, supra note 38, at 336-37.  
183 Id. at 337. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 337-38. 
186 Id. at 337. 
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A middle ground view of imaging technologies goes directly 
to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.187  
The question then is whether the search was reasonable under the 
circumstances.188  How is this decided?  “The greater the level 
of suspicion, the more intrusive the search may be.... 
[I]ntrusion is keyed to embarrassment, indignity, and invasion 
of privacy.”189  
On the other side, opponents of backscatter x-rays for 
passenger screening loudly protest the invasion of privacy 
caused by this technology.  Backscatter x-rays utilized as a 
primary screening tool would likely have a more difficult time 
satisfying the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment.  While magnetometers do not have the ability to 
detect explosives or biological weapons, trace detection portals 
would clearly be a less intrusive search than backscatter x-rays 
for that purpose.  “Body-scanning is a debasing and humiliating 
procedure, and its routine use fails basic balancing tests....  
                                                
187 Steven Vina, Virtual Strip Searches at Airports: Are Border 
Searches Seeing Through the Fourth Amendment?, 8 Tex. Wesleyan 
L. Rev. 417, 424 (2002). 
188 Id. 
189 United States v. Mejia, 720 F.2d 1378, 1382 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 
 54 
This technology should be used as a last resort.”190  
Manufacturers of the technology say that using backscatter as a 
tool secondary to metal detectors defeats its advantages.191  
They maintain that some of the passengers who do not set off a 
metal detector are exactly the people who should be screened 
with backscatter.192  However, a potential problem of backscatter 
x-rays if used as primary screening devices is that legal items 
might be mistaken for illegal ones, prompting a further 
search.193 
                                                
190 Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Calls for 
Removal of Controversial See-Through Scanner in Orlando (Mar. 
15, 2002) 
(http://www.aclu.org/privacy/gen/14808prs20020315.html).  The 
press release goes on to argue that explosives detection 
equipment may provide the same amount of security as backscatter 
x-rays, but without an invasion of bodily privacy. Id. 
191 Considine, supra note 44.  
192 Id. 
193 “Even the presence of an innocuously shaped item, such as a 
prosthetic device or implant, will require subsequent (and 
potentially humiliating) verification.  Thus, X-ray backscatter 
requires a tremendous invasion of privacy with little speed or 
efficacy gains.” Sparapani, supra note 165. 
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The ACLU is against the use of backscatter x-rays for 
primary passenger screening.194  “Passengers expect privacy 
underneath their clothing and should not be required to display 
highly personal details of their bodies such as evidence of 
mastectomies, colostomy appliances, penile implants, catheter 
tubes, and the size of their breasts or genitals as a 
prerequisite to boarding a plane.”195  Further, security searches 
have been the cover for the sexual assault of many women.196  
Given the amount of detail the backscatter images reveal, 
“[a]buse of this powerful technology is not a hypothetical....  
Given recent experiences, it is inevitable.  Airport security 
personnel do not check their sexual impulses at the door when 
they arrive for work.”197 
Despite all of the legitimate privacy concerns this 
technology presents, it is likely to be accepted, just as metal 
detector searches have been.  But the acceptance should be 
limited to use as a secondary screening tool, as that is the 
                                                
194 Am. Civil Liberties Union, Airport Security: Increased Safety 
Need Not Come at the Expense of Civil Liberties (2002), 
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/resources/16748res20020612.html. 
195 Id. 
196 Am. Civil Liberties Union, supra note 190. 
197 Id. 
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only reasonable application for a technology which is so 
invasive.  Under Skipwith, mere suspicion is all that is 
required to perform an airport passenger search.198  The Skipwith 
opinion permitted the scope of a search to be as broad as 
necessary to confirm the passenger had no weapons while also 
mandating that the imposition on the passenger could be no 
greater than necessary.199  Searches such as pat-downs and strip-
searches have already been found to be reasonable for preventing 
passengers from carrying weapons onto airplanes.200  It is 
therefore likely that backscatter x-rays will be allowed as an 
alternative secondary search form since they are comparably 
invasive, if not actually less so than pat-downs and strip-
searches.201  The Hartwell court stated that a more highly 
invasive search which was narrowly tailored to protect privacy 
and which was utilized only after a regular screening revealed a 
foundation for a more involved search were permitted under the 
administrative search doctrine.202  This rule would support the 
                                                
198 United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1973).  
See supra Part II.B.iii. 
199 Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1272.   
200 Ries, supra note 173. 
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202 United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 180 (3rd Cir. 2006).   
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use of backscatter x-rays as secondary screening tools, and 
conceivably prevent their use for primary screening.  The ACLU, 
one of the most vocal opponents of the use of backscatter x-ray 
for primary screening, supports its use as an alternative to 
body cavity searches which have been legally triggered by other 
primary screening means.203   
The possibility that backscatter x-rays be used for primary 
passenger screening in the future should be resisted.  As many 
voices as possible should rally to defend the right to privacy 
and declare that this type of search is and will remain 
unreasonable to Americans, despite increasing terror fears.   
 
V. Proposal 
 In today’s climate of terror and ever-evolving types of 
threats, it is probably not possible to draw a distinct line 
between what is a reasonable or unreasonable airline passenger 
search under the Fourth Amendment.  The most important principle 
to cling to is to require that searches invade on passengers’ 
privacy as minimally as possible.  “The level of intrusion – the 
                                                
203 “[S]uch technology may be used in place of an intrusive 
search, such as a body cavity search, when there is probable 
cause sufficient to support such a search. Am. Civil Liberties 
Union, supra note 194. 
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degree to which a proposed measure invades privacy – should 
reflect the level of risk, and, if both are effective, the least 
intrusive physical screening technology or technique should 
always trump the more invasive technology.”204  The 
administrative search exception to the Fourth Amendment requires 
this.205  This is similar to the analysis of whether a law 
infringes on a fundamental right involves determining whether 
the law survives strict scrutiny.  The government must show a 
compelling actual purpose for the law, the means must be 
narrowly tailored to the objective, and there can be no less 
restrictive ways to achieve the objective.  Strict scrutiny 
should be applied to the utilization of emerging airport 
technologies that have the possibility of infringing on the 
right to privacy.  Using the least personally invasive means of 
screening airline passengers is how to be certain that there is 
no method less restrictive to the right of privacy. 
 One method of making backscatter x-ray searches less 
intrusive on privacy206 is to have an agent off-site view the 
images in real time.  The embarrassment factor would be greatly 
                                                
204 Sparapani, supra note 165. 
205 See supra Part III.B.ii.  
206 In addition to the cloaking technology, discussed supra in 
Part II.D. 
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reduced if passengers knew that the person viewing the detailed 
images of their bodies were in a remote location.  Only if the 
backscatter revealed a potentially prohibited item would an on-
site agent be notified.  By separating the image from the actual 
person, the general public would be relieved from some of the 
humiliation and indignity that backscatter x-rays could cause.   
Of course, knowing that the person looking at an image of 
their virtually naked body is somewhere else may be of little 
consolation to many passengers.  And people may feel violated 
simply because they feel they have done nothing to deserve this 
level of scrutiny.  Even this possible method of lessening the 
impact of the privacy invasion by the backscatter x-ray leaves 
the technology with too much power at the initial stage of 
passenger screening.  Backscatter x-rays should be deemed 
unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment if used for 
primary screening.  Only when utilized as a substitute for other 
methods currently used in secondary screening, such as pat-downs 
and cavity searches, should the backscatter x-ray be adjudged 
reasonable. 
  
VI. Conclusion 
Even in this post-September 11 era of heightened security 
needs, we must be cautious to not let fear and desire for 
protection override our privacy concerns and warp the definition 
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of “reasonable.”  There is no going back once rights have been 
eroded.  Society will become accustomed to the gradual 
deterioration of rights and one day wake to find that privacy 
rights have disappeared completely, and that was formerly 
considered unreasonable is now reasonable.  There is no doubt we 
face sometimes unimaginable threats, and we should be vigilant 
in trying to guard against them.  However, some emerging 
passenger screening technologies, such as backscatter x-rays, 
have the ability to intrude too far and should be considered 
unreasonable searches if used as a primary screening tool.  We 
must never lose sight of the Fourth Amendment privacy rights 
Americans hold dear. 
